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On the evolution of CAE research1

CLIVE L. DYM1 AND RAYMOND E. LEVITT2
'Department of Engineering, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711-5990.
department of Civil Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305.
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Abstract
Less than a decade ago it seemed that a new paradigm of engineering—called computer-aided engineering (CAE) —
was emerging. This emergence was driven in part by the success of computer support for the tasks of engineering
analysis and in part by a new understanding of how computational ideas largely rooted in artificial intelligence
(AI) could perhaps improve the practice of engineering, especially in the area of design synthesis. However, while
this "revolution" has failed to take root or flourish as a separate discipline, it has spawned research that is very
different from traditional engineering research. To the extent that such CAE research is different in style and paradigm, it must also be evaluated according to different metrics. Some of the metrics that can be used are suggested,
and some of the evaluation issues that remain as open questions are pointed out.
Keywords: CAE Research; Computational Paradigms; Designers' Assistants

1. INTRODUCTION
It seemed in the early 1980s as if a new wave of computational power was about to sweep across — and radically
change—the face of engineering research, education, and
practice. The wave derived in part from the considerable
success achieved in computational support for engineering analysis in domains as diverse as the finite-element
analysis of structures and the nearly automatic layout of
large-scale integrated circuits. The new computational
wave also derived from and paralleled the success that artificial intelligence (AI) was expected to have in solving
"real" problems that were not susceptible to numerical or
algorithmic solution. The "hype" attached to the rapid
growth of this branch of computer science was also felt
in its application fields, and there was widespread optimism, at least among its adherents, that some AI paradigms-the most notable being knowledge-based (expert)
systems—would provide extraordinary leverage for solving engineering problems. To be sure, there was (and still
is) a countervailing view among traditional, engineering
science-oriented researchers and practitioners that these
emerging paradigms lacked the rigor needed to make a serious contribution, and history may prove that in some
Reprint requests to: Prof. Clive Dym, Department of Engineering,
Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, CA 91711-5990. Telephone: 909-6218853, Fax: 909-621-8967, E-mail: clive_dym@hmc.edu.
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sense these skeptics are closer to the mark. However, at
that time the pioneers of these new paradigms felt confident that their broader vision would emerge triumphant.
Along with the optimism and the hype, there developed
the expectation that the emphasis of many engineering
graduate programs would shift from an analytical, engineering science style to one that emphasized both numerical and nonnumerical computation to formalize a broad
range of engineering tasks. The programs in computeraided engineering (CAE) would stress software engineering, computer languages, programming environments,
and a general understanding of software and hardware issues as the counterparts of traditional engineering knowledge in much the same way that many engineering science
programs stressed applied mathematics as the essential
implementation ingredient or "language" for doing any
particular branch of engineering science. And it should
be recognized that the thrust of such programs would be
aimed both at engineering design perse and at synthesizing engineering design, analysis, and manufacturing. That
is, the thrust assumed that computational tools to support
engineering analysis were already accepted as an integral
part of engineering practice. In fact, the success of these
computational tools provided both a measure of credibility for the further application of computers in engineering and, as noted below, a need for still more powerful
computational tools to support the tasks of design synthesis, documentation, assembly and manufacturing, and
planning and control.
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It was also anticipated that the growth of CAE would
be fostered by a continuation of the decline in the cost of
computing power. This cost trend would have the result
of making workstations, high-end personal computers, and
their associated computing environments readily and
widely available. As a result of the increased availability
of cheap computing power, graduate students and their
advisers became advocates (and, in some cases, zealots) for
the increased use of computers to support or automate engineering tasks. In addition, this cost trend influenced the
development of techniques for distributing and coordinating complex engineering tasks. In particular, powerful
local and wide-area networks linked engineers one to another and made it possible to decompose complex tasks
organizationally and geographically. For example, large
AEC firms such as Fluor, Bechtel, and CRSS routinely
partition large design projects and use computer technology (e.g., different layers in shared three-dimensional
CAD models) to allow teams of specialists to design different parts of the projects from geographically remote
offices around the world. While such computer-aided
project decomposition made it easier to employ distributed teams of specialists on complex projects, it also created significant new problems (and opportunities) in the
areas of version control, data and information representation, database accessibility, and propagation of design
standards and techniques.
The interest in the new Al-based paradigms and the declining cost of computing naturally fostered research into
applications of these new styles of engineering computing. However, what developed less rapidly was a concomitant development of assessment and evaluation standards
for these new areas of research and practice. Traditional
engineering science research quite easily adopted the basic scientific approach wherein reproducibility was the key
evaluation standard — that is, the ability of investigators
to reproduce in their own laboratories the work of others done elsewhere. While developed primarily for experimental work, the reproducibility standard was also
applicable to analytical work and, after suitable benchmarks were designated by the appropriate communities,
to numerical computational work.
The situation for the Al-based paradigms did not allow a simple extrapolation of the reproducibility standard
because many of the problems being encapsulated in Albased programs were viewed as ill-structured — a viewpoint that is itself open to debate (Reich, 1994)—and their
solutions as idiosyncratic because the expertise of particular domain experts was being used to develop new
knowledge bases (a term, by the way, that did not even
exist before the emergence of AI paradigms because numerical- and graphics-based programs were not thought of
as repositories of "domain knowledge"). The application
of the reproducibility standard was further complicated
by widespread use of different programming languages
and environments, and even more so by the different rep-
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resentation formalisms (e.g., rules and objects) as they became available.
Given the problems attendant to applying the standard
of reproducibility, are there metrics that could be used to
evaluate CAE research in general and Al-based research
in particular? In the discussion that follows, four criteria
for evaluating CAE research as an identifiable intellectual
approach to engineering will be discussed and examined.
They are as follows:
1. The routine use of KBESs and other Al-based programs in industry to do identifiable and meaningful tasks.
2. The ability of such programs, whether or not in
practical use, to point toward useful ways of identifying and formalizing engineering knowledge.
3. The ability of such research to provide further understanding and clarification of the structure of engineering knowledge.
4. The ability of such research to extend and enlarge
the engineering profession's understanding of engineering computation.
It is worth noting that these criteria are not easily quantifiable—that is, they cannot be subsumed within one or
more "hard numbers." Thus, at least at this stage of development of the field of CAE, the community will have
to accept qualitative assessments of the value of the ideas
and techniques that are being developed and applied. In
a sense, these criteria can be said to amount to a standard
for assessing the reproducibility of ideas, rather than of
specific answers or programs.
2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As noted, one of the forces pushing toward the increasing
use of computers in engineering was the success achieved
with analysis tools, most notably those numerical algorithms used to analyze complex designed artifacts such as
aircraft structures, skyscrapers, integrated circuits, and
sophisticated machinery. These algorithmic programs
were based on procedural paradigms that employed numerical representations of various kinds of formulas. A
related development, albeit one that came much later and
rather more slowly, was the ability to draw and visualize
devices of all kinds. These two developments made it possible for engineers and designers to consider, analyze, and
evaluate a much broader range of design alternatives than
were hitherto possible. That is, the cheapness of computerbased analysis allowed engineers to consider alternative
configurations —especially in structural engineering—to
a degree that simply wasn't possible when the extensive
calculations needed to be done by hand, with slide rules,
or with the aid of old-fashioned, mechanical calculating
machines. The free-form, thin shells used in the Trans
World Airlines (TWA) terminal at John F. Kennedy Air-
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port in New York City became possible as alternatives to
barrel vaults and hyperbolic paraboloids because of the
availability of reliable computer-based analysis techniques.
Other interesting structures — for example, the French
headquarters of the International Innovation Institute
(Texedeau & Souchet, 1991) —also became practical as
structural analysts were freed from the need to rely on
closed-form solutions.
In fact, the rapid spread of numerical algorithms in domains such as structural engineering has not only led to
the consideration of more design alternatives — which
might be considered a good result—but has also led to the
increased use of analysis "black boxes" in rather mindless ways that waste both time and other resources. Sometimes, in fact, the mindless use of such tools is dangerous
as well as wasteful, as in the recent instance of the failure of an oil platform under construction in the North Sea
that was traceable in part to the inappropriate application
of a finite-element code to analyze a complicated structure.
Engineering educators see a microcosm of this problem
on a daily basis when students deliver computer-derived
solutions to problems: solutions whose physical dimensions
and units are wrong, whose variables take on inappropriate values, and which show in other ways that students
simply accept without question the results churned out by
whatever software they are exercising.
In practice, of course, this meant that engineering analysis was being reduced to a technician-level job, wherein
the practitioner was expected to know more about the
ways to enter inputs than about the meaning and validity of the output. The ease with which computer-based
analysis could be done thus produced both a burdensome
multiplicity of needless, seemingly endless numerical analyses and a new bottleneck in the design process in which
the engineering talent required to synthesize and evaluate
meaningful solutions became increasingly less common
than the talent available to generate analyses. The rapid
spread of analysis tools was, of course, also fostered by
the proliferation of cheap hardware and software.
Meanwhile, in academe and to a lesser extent in industry, researchers were experimenting with the new AIbased concepts—especially those falling under the rubric
of knowledge-based or expert systems (KBESs)—to model
various engineering tasks. Moving beyond the procedural
paradigms and their numerical representations, researchers found that knowledge-based systems could be used to
deploy engineering knowledge through declarative paradigms based on symbolic representation schemes (Dym &
Levitt, 1991fir).From the start, KBES technology was
attractive because of its capacity to solve ill-structured
problems requiring the formalization and application of
heuristic knowledge, including that which is more scientifically based, even if not representable in formulas and
algorithms. It was recognized that the rule-based paradigms which were the mainstays of early KBESs could
represent deep knowledge compiled from first principles,
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as well as surface knowledge represented in associative
heuristics. While such technology has begun to find a
greater level of acceptance within the broader engineering community, it has required a relatively hard sell by
those who saw its virtues early on.
As mentioned earlier, the contention that the problems
and solutions encapsulated within such KBESs are illstructured is itself open to debate (Reich, 1994). Indeed,
since the knowledge being thus encapsulated is often deep
knowledge based on well-understood physical principles
whose application is also well known, one could argue
that the problems are ill-structured only to the extent that
they do not readily fit into the traditional differential
equation or matrix algebra formalisms for the expression
and application of such knowledge. In this view, it may
be that the debate over the degree of "ill-structuredness"
is not especially telling because the focus of discussion
might more properly be on the understanding of the new
formalisms and their limits, much as the understanding
of the roles of mathematical, numerical, and graphical
models are now well known. However, one related aspect
of this is the depth of understanding that the developers
of engineering KBES-based problem solvers have of the
domain knowledge being encapsulated in these programs.
There are several aspects of this issue that are worth exploring, including the achievements of AI researchers
working on their own, the efficacy of collaborations between AI researchers and engineers and designers, and the
domain backgrounds of newly-minted Ph.D.s in the infant discipline called CAE.
The first aspect is easy to deal with because there do not
seem to be any success stories of engineering or design
systems developed by AI researchers working entirely on
their own. Indeed, once the developers of "smart" programs moved beyond solving classical puzzles (e.g., missionaries-and-cannibals, the 8-puzzle, etc.), they found
that they needed to work with domain experts to achieve
success in any field, whether the domain was medicine,
geology, computer configuration, or engineering. This is
a lesson that industry seems to have learned and absorbed, perhaps more so than the academic community.
The most notable success stories, measured in terms of
daily and consistent use of KBES technologies by companies that are interested in improving their efficiency and
bottom-line performance, all involve active and deep collaboration between researchers versed in KBES ideas and
techniques and respected domain experts. Three recent examples of this drawn from the authors' experience—there
are certainly others—are as follows:
1. The PRIDE system for the configuration design of
paper-handling subsystems of copiers was developed
through a collaboration between a respected AI researcher, an engineer interested in exploring the representation of design knowledge, and a team of
engineers and designers who were very experienced in
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the design domain (Mittal et al., 1986). The PRIDE
system is now in active use by designers at the Xerox Corporation.
2. The HAZTIMATOR system for configuring soil vapor extraction (SVE) treatment of contaminated soil
was developed in a collaboration between researchers at Stanford University and hazardous waste remediation engineers at CM2 Hill (Oralkan et al.,
1994). This system has been validated and will serve
as a prototype for a full-blown commercial system.
3. The DEEP system for the configuration design of
electric service for residential plats was developed
by researchers at Harvey Mudd College collaborating with designers and planners at Southern California Edison (Demel et al., 1992). That system is
currently being integrated into the day-to-day design
environments used by SCE designers because SCE
managers anticipate a substantial improvement in
productivity as a result of this integration.
Thus, in terms of the first criterion of success mentioned
above, it is clear that there are examples of success stories, and more are being developed everyday. It is worth
asking, moreover, why these development projects produced successful results, whereas research projects undertaken by many academic researchers have not "taken
off," that is, they have generally not led to some obvious
real-world application or integration. In fact, it is interesting to note that, while these and other collaborative
projects were being undertaken, a few advanced research
programs were turning out Ph.D.s with an almost messianic zeal for the technology. This next generation of researchers should have formed a corps of shock troops
who should have successfully propagated this new vision
of engineering computing. But there was no explosion of
graduate programs in the CAE arena. Although strong
and viable groups were established at a few schools—the
most notable one being that led by Professor Steven J.
Fenves at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU)—the idea
simply didn't take off. Indeed, while researchers in this
area can now be found in many American engineering
schools, it is rare indeed that there is more than one faculty member in a department whose principal focus is
CAE. Indeed, even the Ph.D. recipients of the few programs that are active are finding it very difficult to find
good academic positions, since they are often viewed as
lacking sufficient depth in an engineering domain area
(Fenves, 1993).
The lack of programmatic success was not due to a
shortage of ideas or vision because, as researchers experimented with merging different computational paradigms
and their representations [e.g., Levitt (1990)], an intellectual framework was also beginning to emerge, built on the
notion that the Al-based work would serve as the "glue"
for truly integrated computational environments for engineering [e.g., Dym & Levitt (19916)]. There were early
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examples of such integration to lead the way [e.g., Darwiche et al. (1989) and Dym et al. (1988)]. Nor was the
failure to propagate and spawn similar academic programs due to the expense of computing. After all, the cost
of computer power was declining as, over time, KBES developers were able to migrate away from expensive Lisp
machines and even more expensive KBES development
software. In fact, commercial vendors began to produce
KBES software that did not require a knowledge of Lisp
or a deep understanding of underlying representation paradigms. These expert system shells were relatively easy to
use, transparent, and portable to mid-level personal computers (such as Mac Us and 286-based PCs). Thus, it
appeared that all the ingredients were falling into place
for the heralded computing revolution: cheap machines,
software that was both more powerful and more "user
friendly," highly visible research and graduate programs,
a wave of graduate students who would spread the gospel to other institutions as new faculty members, and
growing industry interest and support. Thus, CAE should
have been a growth discipline in academia, and yet it has
not turned out that way so far.
Further, in industry and in government, a parallel situation was unfolding in that the anticipated boom in
KBES technology simply did not happen as expected
(Feigenbaum, 1993). This in spite of incredible declines
in the cost of workstations and software. In fact, even after expert system shells became relatively easy to use,
transparent, and portable to high-end personal computers,
there was no mass proliferation of KBESs that performed
or assisted with engineering tasks which even remotely
paralleled the proliferation of numerical analysis and
graphics packages.
It is worth wondering, therefore, whether the failure of
the academic discipline to stand on its own reflects —or
could even be caused by—a lack of clear-cut, recognizable standards for evaluating success. Thus, it is worth examining what did not happen to see how the lack of
rigorous standards for evaluating research may have influenced the course of development of CAE as a separate
academic field.
3. WHY DIDNT CAE(S) TAKE OFF?
Why did the anticipated boom never happen? One major reason is buried in a distinction drawn above, namely,
that the real focus of these new approaches to CAE was
design and design synthesis, what might be called CAE(S).
That is, to the extent that experienced engineers feel that
synthesis is the core part of what they do—the very "soul"
of engineering—they are not willing to surrender it to a
computer, at least not without a serious fight.
3.1. The lack of senior management "champions"

In industry, top management sees the value of reorganizing the work process to automate all routine work and,
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quite often, semi-custom work as well. Driven by the need
to "re-engineer" their work processes in order to remain
competitive, managers in large engineering organizations
are more than willing to explore alternative ways to reduce the costs of doing their engineering work. Inasmuch
as the kind of work is very labor intensive, the obvious
managerial solution is to search for ways to reduce the
number of engineers on staff. Thus, increasingly, managers are launching proof-of-concepts studies that focus
on using KBESs that perform design tasks now done by
experienced designers [e.g., Demel et al. (1992) and Mishelevich et al. (1991)]. While the engineers and designers provide the domain knowledge encapsulated in these
KBES-based design systems, they also recognize that
the success of such systems may make their own work
redundant. Indeed, as a result, it may well be the case
that engineers would viscerally oppose the thrust of this
technology—as indeed all the books on labor relations say
they should! In fact, the introduction of KBES applications has been quite successful only when senior management has been strongly committed to the idea (Riitahuhta,
1988).
In fact, notwithstanding the success stories presented
in Section 1, there has been much more success in developing these approaches to design synthesis in Europe,
with a concomitant increase in design efficiency and a
consequent reduction in engineering staff. The story of
the Intelligent Boiler Design System (IBDS) is instructive
in this regard. Developed by Tampella Power Industries
of Tempere, Finland (Dym & Levitt, 1991a; Riitahuhta,
1998), IBDS is a knowledge-based design system used for
the semi-custom design of power generation boilers. Designs that would take months are now done in days, and
Tampella's engineering staff now focuses on product research and development rather than on semi-custom design. Similar results can be reported for some of the
design systems mentioned in Section 1, i.e., PRIDE and
DEEP.
3.2. The KBES "consultant" paradigm
Another factor retarding the adoption of expert systems
is the basic consultation paradigm employed by these systems. That is, rule-based KBES design systems are meant
to be advisors or consultants, although in this context they
provide advice to the engineers and designers. In this paradigm the engineer is then placed in the role of acting as
a "sensor for an intelligent machine." Thus, such consultative systems are likely to be no more popular with engineering designers than earlier medical diagnostic KBESs
were with physicians.
3.3. The fragmentation of the AEC industry
And, finally, from the industrial perspective, and especially in domains such as civil engineering and construc-

tion, the fabric of the industry is fragmented. Most AEC
companies are in fact quite small, and they are labor intensive rather than capital intensive. Thus, they have limited resources for their own infrastructure development,
and they have limited interest in sharing the development
of appropriate tools with their competitors — unless they
are forced into such investment by the competition. In addition, mitigating against cooperation and data sharing
in such a fragmented industry are concerns about liability and about the ownership of intellectual property.
Thus, industry as a whole has not been especially supportive of academic research in this area—which is in this case
especially ironic because civil engineering departments are
among the most active academic disciplines in CAE/
CAE(S).
3.4. The lack of programmatic financial support
On the academic side, there may be several reasons that
programs such as the ones at CMU and Stanford University have not flourished at many other places. One is, of
course, that these ideas emerged at the same time as the
beginning of a slide in the availability of external research
support aimed at individual Pi's and projects and while
American colleges and universities were feeling sharp financial pressures. Thus, the inclination to invest heavily
in new ideas and programs, which was never very strong
in the rather conservative engineering education establishment, was further reduced by the lack of resources to hire
new faculty and create new laboratories. The successful
programs flourished because they obtained large-scale
programmatic support, such as CMU's Engineering Design Research Center (EDRC) and Stanford's Center for
Integrated Facility Engineering (CIFE).
3.5. The perceived lack of domain expertise
of CAE researchers
Further, those departments that were willing to consider
hiring new faculty in this area wondered about the depth
of the engineering training that the new Ph.D.s were receiving in their engineering fundamentals. There was a
concern that the depth of training in computer and software engineering was achieved at the expense of depth in
technical areas such as structural or geotechnical engineering. Thus, prospective academic employers were somewhat skeptical that graduates of such programs would
have the necessary engineering expertise. On the other
hand, and somewhat ironically, for those industrial firms
that wanted to experiment with KBES technology, such
graduates were nearly ideal because they could talk both
to in-house computing personnel and to the relevant engineers and designers.
The issue of the depth of domain knowledge of CAE
researchers is also important in the context of research assessment and evaluation. It was noted above that the most
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successful outcomes — at least as measured by the first criterion identified in Section 1 —were generated in active
collaborations between academic researchers and domain
experts from industry—and this dichotomy often overlaps
with the distinction between computer scientists (the "academic researchers") and engineers (the "domain experts"). It is, in fact, part and parcel of the same problem.
An essential ingredient of a successful collaboration,
whether aimed at doing successful research or at building a useful product, is true collaboration between those
who are really expert in the domain being modeled and
those whose focus is the representation and programming
technology. And, to the extent that academic "domain experts" lack real-world experience at dealing with seemingly ill-structured problems (i.e., problems not readily
formulated in analytical or numerical terms) or that their
training has emphasized the CA part of CAE, the prognosis for success is not good. That is, projects fail because
the domain expertise is not sufficient to deal with the real
problems, whatever they may be.
In saying this, one may in fact be repeating a criticism
often voiced by engineers and managers in industry, that
typical research-minded academics do not have a good
grasp of real engineering problems. However, it is also
often the case that academic "domain experts" are not
especially aware of just how brittle their own expertise
and knowledge is. The misuse of FEM packages, for example, is not limited to novice "black box" users in industry. In part this brittleness is a result of increased
specialization, and in part it is likely a result of a significant diminution in the depth that doctoral candidates are
expected to show before completing their academic training. This lack of depth will obviously be felt downstream
as new faculty become responsible for training succeeding generations of researchers and practitioners. And, it
must be noted, this problem is not limited to students in
and graduates of CAE programs, wherein there is an explicit trade-off of depth for a certain kind of breadth.
Rather, it is part of a general change in educational values and standards that is moving toward producing
generalists.

4. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
What is to be learned from the past that will enable better preparation for the future, in terms of undergraduate
and graduate education, research, and engineering practice? The main points are as follows. First, the age of integrated engineering computing environments is not far
off. Graphics packages are already being converted from
using layering for data storage and sorting to using objectbased representations that facilitate the inclusion of object attributes and calculation methods with graphical and
visual information (Dym, 1994). And while the KBES applications domain is not as large as anticipated a decade
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ago, there are still many researchers and practitioners who
are developing KBESs for engineering design synthesis
and as front ends to other engineering tools. And industry, in particular, is showing increasing interest in such integrated engineering environments in order to foster more
intelligent design interactions that encompass all the
phases of the life cycle of a designed artifact, their motivations being to increase both quality and efficiency (by
eliminating apparently redundant staff).
Indeed, now that the cost of shells and their platforms
has become so low, and their availability so high, many
more companies are coming out of the recession of the
last six years thinking about investing in this technology
for the future. Higher level tools for design synthesis, based
on AI concepts, are now available (e.g., Design++™,
ICAD™). Such tools can be used to reduce both the cost
of developing designs and the time it takes to introduce
them. Further, as noted earlier, many design-intensive
organizations—such as utilities and large AEC firms—are
trying to reduce their costs by restructuring and shrinking
their professional staffs. Thus, the combination of economic forces, the desire to reinvent the design organization, and the technical developments in the field may now
lead to the long-delayed boom in the deployment of
KBES design systems. And, as will be noted in the next
paragraph, one of the consequences of the deployment of
KBES technology will be some major shifts in the responsibilities and numbers of engineers who will be working
in increasingly computer-intensive environments.
There are several implications for engineering education. The first is that as more engineering analysis and
synthesis tasks are automated, there is less need for engineers who will simply run such programs as black boxes,
oblivious to the built-in assumptions and ranges of validity of application. That is, the engineers will truly have
to understand the physical fundamentals of their domains, as well as the expected behavior of the artifacts
and devices they are analyzing and synthesizing. In design
in particular, they will have to recognize the multiplicity
of languages and representations of designed objects, so
that they can be conversant with the ways their automated
"designer's assistants" are manipulating synthesis information (Dym, 1993, 1994). Particularly at the undergraduate level, one consequence should be an end to the
perennial debate about which programming language to
teach engineering students. Except for a very small number of engineers who might actually be involved in writing software, most engineers will be users of increasingly
sophisticated and accessible software. Thus, students
should learn to become discerning and sophisticated users
of packages (whether for spreadsheets, FEM, graphics,
etc.) rather than amateur programmers.
At the graduate level, similar cautions would pertain.
There ought to be renewed emphasis on fundamentals, on
modeling, on behavior, and on the representations used
to portray the different kinds of engineering knowledge
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that are applied in expert problem solving. While the need
for continued research in Al-oriented representation and
computational integration will persist, the emphasis will
likely shift toward modeling issues that are more organizational than technical, as with current work on concurrent engineering and on modeling design teams (Levitt
etal., 1994).
Note that these assessments of how undergraduate and
graduate engineering education will change reflect, in effect, the success of CAE(S) as a field when measured
against all four criteria set out in Section 1. That is to say,
the changes in engineering education that are anticipated
above mirror the application of new computational paradigms, a refinement of both the meaning and the structure of engineering knowledge, and continuing change in
the roles that computers play in engineering practice.
Furthermore, it would not be surprising if the spread
of automation to design synthesis for routine and semicustom work would lead to a significant reduction in the
demand for engineering graduates, particularly those who
stop their engineering education at the baccalaureate. An
undergraduate engineering education is still perhaps the
best approach to a "liberal education for a technological
age," but it will no longer provide an immediate entree
to a well-paid professional life, as has been the case for
the last five decades. Rather, the engineering baccalaureate will more likely become an indicator of educational
achievement, much as current B.A. and B.S. degrees are
viewed. Thus, the number and kinds of undergraduates in engineering might also shift dramatically in the
future —and the numbers likely in a downward direction — with obvious consequences for engineering schools
and colleges.
As a natural consequence of some of the previous possibilities, the roles of engineering schools and the nature
of their faculties might well be pushed toward a professional model with the characteristics of medical and law
schools. In such a model.the professional degrees would
clearly be awarded only at the graduate level, and the faculty will become more diverse in the sense that seasoned
practitioners, who may do little or no research, but who
will have experience and contacts in the "real world,"
would become mainstays of engineering programs. As accomplished practitioners and designers become part of the
faculty mix, the reward structure —especially the expectations underlying tenure reviews — will have to change,
as will perhaps the view of which faculty are truly the
elite.
Thus, finally, it would seem that the second and third
criteria may be met by the field of CAE(S), if not necessarily by individual programs and their creators, because
this reinvention of engineering education reflects a fundamental shift in the engineering paradigm. This shift will
move the profession away from the analytically oriented,
engineering science paradigm toward one in which knowledge is applied through many structures and representa-

tions, often through computational means. The encomiums
and rewards will be earned by those who can decide what
needs to be done to solve an engineering problem and how
that solution should be implemented, and can then articulate why the approach taken is the correct one.
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